~~SECRET~~ DRAFT

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

13 August 1950

SUBJECT : Taiwan Situation

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

1. Reference Radio, AG 22922, from USMILAT, Taipei, dated 12 Aug 50 (Tab 1)

2. As was indicated in Adm Jarrett's comment, Richard Lee is connected with the TANG En-po - MAO San clique which has been striving to gain power through control of mainland anti-Communist guerrillas. Activities of this clique has been definitely restricted recently as the result of government reforms on Taiwan, and because Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-shek is also desirous of controlling the mainland resistance cells. This may be their reason for moving to Hong Kong. Another reason could be that they are planning to join forces with former Acting President LI Tsung-jen's group who are striving to organize a "third party" in opposition to the Communists and CHIANG Kai-shek's Nationalist regime.

3. The statement made by Richard Lee regarding Chinese Communist capabilities for invading Taiwan does, however, contain certain possibilities. The Communists have about 600,000 troops assembled along the coast of China opposite Taiwan, with approximately 200,000 troops (seven armies) in the Amoy-Fuchou area. Considerable Communist activity has been reported in that area during the past month. Much of this activity has been attributed to a Communist build-up for an attack on Kinmen Island, but the Communists may elect to by-pass that Nationalist outpost and strike directly at Taiwan. The Nationalist G-2 (Gen Fisher T. HO) estimates that the Communists possess sufficient bottoms to transport seven armies, totaling about 200,000 troops, to the beaches of Taiwan. He believes, however, that the attack will come from three directions--one force from the Shanghai-Hangchou area, one force from the Amoy-Fuchou area, and one force from the Canton-Swatou area. In this respect, increased reports of Soviet submarine activity along the China coast, and the probability that the Soviets have turned over former

Japanese combat vessels to the Communists are considered significant factors. It is considered improbable that any surface invading force from the mainland could reach Taiwan during the hours of darkness. Even at nine knots, which is believed to be a high estimated rate of speed for motor driven junks on the open sea, it would take at least twelve uninterrupted hours to make the crossing from Fuchou, the nearest point on the mainland.

4. A study of climatic conditions and oceanography in the Formosa Strait reveals that the period prior to 1 September is most favorable to amphibious operations. In addition, prior to about 20 August the beaches on the west coast of Taiwan are most favorable to landing forces as rice paddies are dry during the semi-annual harvest season. After 1 September, rough seas and occassional typhoons create hazards to small craft in the Formosa Strait. Flooded rice paddies also hinder movement inland from the beaches.

5. Although the possibility of defections and uprisings on Taiwan in conjunction with a Communist assault exists, it is believed that the recent U.S. action regarding defense of the island will prove a strong deterrent to such action. Plans for defection of certain elements of the Nationalist defense forces were discovered recently and the necessary corrective action was taken. The Nationalist G-2 feels that the threat of internal disorders is not great at this time.

6. For your convenience a map showing geographic locations is enclosed as Tab 2.

7. This is for information only.

C. A. H.

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1. Radio, AG 22922 (Tab 1)
2. Map of China Coast (Tab 2)